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iv

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Respondent,
Case No. 20051115-SC

vs.
GERALD STEVEN WALLACE,
Defendant/Petitioner.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of
Appeals. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(5) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) (West 2004) prohibit a trial court
from imposing more than thirty-six months probation for any felony offense?
2. May a court impose consecutive terms of probation for multiple felony
convictions?
Standard of Review. On certiorari review, this Court must determine whether
the court of appeals accurately reviewed the trial court decision under the
appropriate standard of review. See State v. On, 2005 UT 92, f 7,127 P.3d 1213.

Defendant did not object to his sentence in the trial court (R. 415:10-14).
Consequently, the court of appeals reviewed his sentence for illegality under rule
22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,117,
124 P.3d 259. Accordingly, this Court must determine whether the court of appeals
correctly determined that defendant's sentence was not illegal.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statutes and rules are attached as Addendum D:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West 2004);
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 8,2004, a jury convicted defendant of one count of racketeering,
three counts of securities fraud, one count of selling an unregistered security, and
one court of selling a security without a license (R. 363-64; 414:456-57). The
convictions arose from defendant's participation in a Ponzi scheme that defrauded
several homeowners out of approximately $625,000 of equity in their homes (R.
412:86,88-89,159,203).i
At the sentencing hearing, on September 27,2004, the trial court made clear
that it was not going to send defendant to jail (R. 415:4). Rather, it wanted to ensure

1

A Ponzi scheme is an investment program that uses money from later
investors to pay earnings to earlier investors (R. 413:373).
2

that he paid full restitution and that the restitution plan would not "put [defendant]
in a position to fail" (R. 415:4, 8). Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to
consecutive prison terms for each conviction, but suspended the prison terms and
placed defendant on probation (R. 382-83; 415:10-11). The court then said, "I don't
want you on probation for 36 months. Probation is going to be a lot longer than
that" (R. 415:11). The court explained, "I want it longer intentionally so that we're
giving you as long an opportunity as possible to make restitution payments" (R.
415:11).
The court then asked, "How far can I set it with six consecutive felonies?" (R.
415:11). An unidentified person said, "Well, I think you can run it 36 months - " (R.
415:11). The judge responded, "Currently on each one?" (R. 415:11). The prosecutor
then pointed out that a co-defendant was on probation for twelve years (R. 415:11).
The judge said, "That's what I'm inclined to do in this particular case as well. Place
you on probation for a period of 144-months, a 12-year period" (R. 415:11).
Defendant did not object to the length of his probation (R. 415:11-14). See
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 19. Instead, after accepting probation, he obtained new
counsel and filed a timely notice of appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals (R. 390). In
that court, he claimed for the first time that his 144-month probation violated Utah
law. See Br. Aplt. at 21. Specifically, he asserted that Utah Code Ann. § 77-18l(10)(a)(i) (West 2004) prohibits courts from imposing a probation term of greater
3

than thirty-six months.2 That section states, "Probation may be terminated at any
time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36
months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of
class B or C misdemeanors or infractions/' Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i).
Defendant reasoned that section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) required courts to terminate
felony probation after thirty-six months, and that a court could only, therefore,
impose a felony probation term of thirty-six months. Br. Aplt. at 44
The State responded that the use of the word // may ,/ in section 77-18l(10)(a)(i) made the thirty-six month probation termination date discretionary, not
mandatory. See Br. Aple. at 43-47. The State further pointed out that defendant had
not yet completed thirty-six months of probation without violation, so he had not
yet fulfilled all the conditions to trigger a termination of probation under the statute.
See Br. Aple. at 47. He thus could not invoke section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) to show that
his sentence was illegal. The State also argued that even if probation was limited to
thirty-six month terms, the district court intended to impose six consecutive
probation terms of twenty-four months each. See Br. Aple. at 48-49.

2

Defendant also claimed the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence that
his violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act were willful. See Br. Aplt. at 21.
The court of appeals held, however, that the evidence of defendant's willfulness was
sufficient. Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 16.
4

In a published opinion, the court of appeals held that defendant's sentence
was not illegal. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, f 17. It explained that section 77-18l(l)(a)(i) "simply states that a court 'may' terminate probation upon completion of
thirty-six months probation, so long as no violation has occurred within that time."
Id. at 118. It held that a district court has discretion to terminate probation within
that time frame, but is not limited to imposing only probation of thirty-six months.
Id. Because it held that section 77-18-1 (10) (a)(i) did not prohibit probation terms of
longer than thirty-six months, the court of appeals did not reach the question of
whether a trial court may impose consecutive probation terms for separate offenses.
Id. at 119 n.ll.
Defendant petitioned this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion
of the court of appeals. This Court granted the petition as to the following two
questions: "1. Whether Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) creates a thirty-six month
limitation for a term of probation as to any felony conviction.

2. Whether

consecutive terms of probation for multiple convictions may be imposed." See
Order, dated February 21,2006.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I
Defendant asserts that the 144-month probation term he accepted at
sentencing violates Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i). Defendant is incorrect. As
5

the court of appeals correctly held, the statute does not restrict a trial court's
authority to impose probation for a term longer than thirty-six months. It only
authorizes a trial court to release an offender from probation if he completes a
thirty-six month term without violation.
POINT II
Defendant asserts that trial courts may not impose consecutive terms of
probation for multiple offenses. He reasons that section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) puts an
absolute cap of thirty-six months on probation time, regardless of the number of
offenses involved. He also argues that probation is not a "sentence" within the
purview of the consecutive sentencing statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (West
2004), but rather, is merely the result of a suspended sentence.
As explained in Point I, section 77-18-1 does not cap a probation term at
thirty-six months. But even if it did, the cap would not bar consecutive terms of
probation for multiple convictions. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2), a sentence
includes probation. In that same chapter, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 permits courts
to order multiple sentences to run consecutively. Thus, a trial court may order a
defendant who is guilty of multiple offenses to serve multiple probations
consecutively.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) DOES NOT PROHIBIT A
TRIAL COURT FROM IMPOSING A PROBATION TERM
LONGER THAN THIRTY-SIX MONTHS
Defendant claims that a trial court may not impose a term of probation longer

than thirty-six months. Br. Pet. at 7-17. Specifically, he claims that the plain
language and the legislative history of Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) (West
2004) demonstrate the legislature's intent to limit a felony probation to a thirty-six
month period, regardless of the severity of the crime, the offender's rehabilitative
needs, or the number of offenses. Br. Pet. at 7.
Defendant did not object to his sentences and accepted the probation terms
(R. 415:10-14). Consequently, the court of appeals reviewed the sentences under
rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which permits courts to correct an
illegal sentence at any time. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 17. A sentence is
illegal if it is "beyond the authorized statutory range/ 7 See State v. Telford, 2002 UT
51, f 5 n.l, 48 P.3d 228. Thus, this Court must determine if Utah Code Ann. § 77-18l(10)(a)(i) imposes a thirty-six-month statutory limitation on the length of probation
for six felony convictions.

7

A. A trial court's authority to grant and terminate probation is
statutory.
A trial court's authority "to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely
statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the court's
discretion must be exercised within the limits imposed by the legislature." Smith v.
Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 791 (Utah 1990). See also State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,463 (Utah
1988). The trial court's authority to sentence a defendant to probation is found in
Utah Code Ann. §76-3-201 (2)(c) (West 2004). That section states, "Within the limits
prescribed by [chapter three], a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense
to any one of the following sentences or combination of them:... (c) to probation,
unless otherwise specifically provided by law." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2). That
section does not, however, set a minimum or a maximum term of probation, nor
does it describe how to modify, extend, terminate, or revoke probation. See Wallace,
2005 UTApp 434,118.
Instead, the procedures and mechanics of granting and terminating probation
are found in chapter eighteen of the criminal procedure code, specifically Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1 (West 2004). That section describes how a court grants probation,
who may supervise probation, when probation may be terminated, and how to
extend, modify, or revoke probation. Defendant claims that subsection 77-18l(10)(a)(i) also limits the length of probation a court may impose for a felony to

8

thirty-six months. Br. Pet. at 10. This claim presents a question of statutory
interpretation.
B.

By its plain language Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) does not
limit the length of probation a trial court may impose.
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "ascertain and effectuate

the Legislature's intent." State v. Hunt, 906 P.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (citation
omitted). The Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain
language of the statute. Id. If possible, the statutory language should be given a
literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 883 P.2d 1360,1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the
plain language of the statute is clear, there is no need to look further. See Visitor Info.
Ctr. Auth. v. Customer Sew. Div., 930 P.2d 1196,1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the statute
on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain facts
of legislative history."); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890
P.2d 1017,1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be
held to mean what it expresses, and no room is left for construction." (quotations
and citations omitted)).
A court may not add or subtract statutory terms. See Reinkraut v. Shalala, 854
F.Supp. 838, 841 (D. Utah 1994). "Under the plain meaning rule, we seek the
meaning of the statute from its very language, and if it is straightforward, we
simply enforce it according to its terms.

9

Its words then bear 'their ordinary

meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract from [that] which
is stated

'" Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation

omitted).
The plain meaning of section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) is that a trial court may
terminate a felony offender's probation after thirty-six months without violation. It
states, "Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the court or
upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or
infractions/7 Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) (emphasis added); see also Wallace,
2005UTApp434,<][18.
By its plain language, section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) is permissive, not restrictive.
See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, \ 18. The primary legal sense of the word "may" is:
"Is permitted to." Black's Law Dictionary 443 (2d. Pocket Ed. 2001). Utah courts
have consistently construed the word "may" as permissive or discretionary. See
Holmes Dev. LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38, \ 25, 48 P.3d 895 ("The plain, ordinary, and
accepted meaning of the word 'may' is 'permissive' or 'discretionary,' generally
indicating that an individual is either 'permitted' or '[h]as a possibility' to do
something.") (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 993 (7th ed. 1999)); Evans v. Bd. Of
County Comm'rs, 2004 UT App 256, \ 20, 97 P.3d 697 (citing cases in which Utah
courts have construed "may" as permissive).
10

"[T]he word 'may' imports

permission, privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of opportunity or
power. It is never properly used in a denial, a restriction, or a limitation, except in
connection with the word 'not.'" State v. Mclntyre, 66 P.2d 879,881 (Utah 1937).
Understood in its permissive context, section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) grants trial
courts authority to terminate a felony offender's probation if he completes thirty-six
months without a violation. It does not, however, prohibit a trial court from setting
a longer term of probation in anticipation of an offender needing more than thirtysix months to complete probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,118. Thus a court
may give a prooationer such as defendant, who has a large amount of restitution to
pay, a longer period of probation within which to pay restitution. And if defendant
pays his restitution and completes thirty-six months without a violation, the court
may terminate his probation early. Similarly, offenders who require drug, alcohol,
or sex offender therapy may be given lengthier terms in anticipation of requiring
more than thirty-six months to complete treatment.
Defendant nevertheless argues that the disjunctive connector "or" converts
the thirty-six month period from a discretionary date to a mandatory period. Br.
Pet. at 8-10. Essentially, he asserts that the word "or" before the clause "upon
completion without violation" usurps the permissive meaning of the word "may" in
the preceding clause "[probation may be terminated" and makes the second half of
section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) mandatory rather than permissive. But "or" is merely a
11

conjunction that makes two events alternatives. Those alternatives are still subject
to the clause that precedes them. In other words, section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) gives trial
courts discretion to terminate probation in one of two scenarios: (1) when the
offender completes thirty-six months without violation, or (2) any other time before
the end of the probation period. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <f 18. Neither of
these alternatives, however, prohibit a trial court from setting the initial term of
probation at longer than thirty-six months.
This permissive construction of section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) is not only apparent
from the plain language of the statute, it is also consistent with its legislative history.
C.

A permissive construction of the statute is consistent with its
legislative history.
Up until 1984, there were no guidelines on when and how a trial court could

terminate an offender's probation. 3 Earlier versions of Utah Code of Criminal
Procedure merely said that the court could "suspend the imposition or execution of
sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period of time as it
determines/ 7 1980 Utah Laws 141, c. 15, § 2, 77-18-1(1); see also Smith v. Cook, 803
P.2d 788,791-92 (Utah 1990) (explaining that before 1984 amendment, section 77-18-

3

Consistent with the code of criminal procedure, this brief uses the term
"terminate" to describe the successful completion of probation. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18-l(10)(a)(i). The term "revoke" is used to describe stopping probation and
sending the offender to prison. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(ii).
12

1 "did not limit length of time a person convicted of a felony could be placed on
probation").
In 1984, the Legislature added subsection (10)(a) to section 77-18-1. See 1984
Utah Laws 88, c. 20, § 1. That subsection then read, "Upon completion without
violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six
months in class B misdemeanor cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence
and the supervision of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier
terminated by the court." Id. (emphasis added).
At that time, however, the Legislature did not repeal the language found in
subsection 77-18-1(1) that said a trial court could "place the defendant on probation
for such period of time it determines." 1980 Utah Laws 141, c. 15, § 2, 77-18-1(1).
Instead, it modified that language slightly, allowing the court to "place the
defendant on probation for a period of time it may determine, unless otherwise
provided by law." 1984 Utah Laws 88, c. 20 § 1. Thus in 1984, a trial court could
impose any length of probation it determined at sentencing, but was required to
terminate probation in felony cases after eighteen months without a violation. In
other words, subsection (10) (a) regulated under what conditions a trial court was
mandated to terminate probation, but not how long the court could initially set it
for.

13

Three years later, in 1987, the Legislature again amended section 77-18-1. See
1987 Utah Laws 658, c. 114, § 1. It removed the language in subsection 77-18-1(1)
that allowed the court to set probation "for a period of time it may determine, unless
otherwise provided by law/' Id. It did not, however, define a maximum probation
period. Rather, it left in place the requirement that "probation shall be terminated"
when the offender completed eighteen months without violation. Id. (emphasis
added). It also renumbered the relevant subsection, 77-18-1 (10)(a), as 77-18-1 (7)(a).
Id.
The senate sponsor of the 1987 amendments explained during the senate floor
debates that the amendments were needed to "improve the syntax, consolidate or
repeal repetitious or superfluous language, and to clarify ambiguities." Floor
Debate on H.B. 167,47th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (February 25,1987). He also stated
that the amendments "would give the court the flexibility to continue probation
until the probationer completes eighteen months of probation without a violation."
Id.
A year later, this Court interpreted the "shall be terminated" language from
the 1984 amendment as automatically terminating felony probation after eighteen
months. See State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462,464-65 (Utah 1988). The Court held that the
word "shall" was a "strong mandate" and that unless revocation proceedings were
commenced prior to the end of the initial eighteen month period, probation would
14

terminate and the trial court could not thereafter extend or revoke probation. Id.; see
also Smith, 803 P.2d at 792 (construing the 1984 amendments as "limiting the time a
person convicted of a felony can be placed on probation to eighteen months' 7 ).
In its first session after the Green decision, the legislature amended section 7718-1 (7) (a) to its present form. It replaced the phrase "the probation period shall be
terminated" with the phrase "[probation may be terminated." See 1989 Utah Laws
690, c. 226 § 1, 77-18-1 (7)(a). It also increased the time period of a no-violation
termination from eighteen months to thirty-six months. Id.
The shift from "shall" to "may" following the Green decision is significant. See
Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <f 18, n.8. The word "shall" "is 'usually presumed
mandatory and has been interpreted as such previously in this and other
jurisdictions.'" Pugh v. Draper City, 2005 UT 12,113,114 P.3d 546 (quoting Bd. of
Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030,1033 (Utah 1983)). The word "may" on the
other hand, "imports permission, privilege, liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of
opportunity or power." Mclntyre, 66 P.2d at 881; see also discussion supra pt. LB.
The Green court had interpreted the "shall be terminated" language as
essentially placing an eighteen-month limit on probation, absent a violation. See
Smith, 803 P.2d at 791-92. By replacing "shall" with "may," the legislature signaled
its intent to overrule Green and make termination after thirty-six violation-free
months a permissive act of the court rather than a strong mandate that
15

automatically terminated probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, <f 18 n.8. The
effect was essentially to return the statute to its pre-1984 construction: Courts may
set probation for any length of time that is necessary, and when the offender
completes thirty-six months without violation, the court may terminate supervised
probation. See discussion supra pt. LB.
Defendant nevertheless claims that the legislative history demonstrates that a
trial court may not set probation for longer than thirty-six months, regardless of the
severity or number of offenses or the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. Br. Pet.
at 11-13. Defendant points to the floor debates of the 1989 amendment for support.
Br. Pet. at 13. During the third reading of the amendment in the House of
Representatives, the sponsor of the amendment explained:
Thank you, Mr. Speaker. House Bill 314 is intended to correct a major
problem in the AP&P area. Both the courts and the department of
corrections have had difficulty in managing the probationers within
the statutory limits that we currently have. The time limits on
probations have been difficult to collect the fines and restitutions
owing or to complete other programs within the probation period. And
this bill, number one, extends the probationary period for, number one,
misdemeanants, from six to twelve months, and for felons from
eighteen to thirty-six months. Number two, it codifies the present
practice of the court putting convicted person on probation with an
agency of local government or a private organization, and lastly, it
allows the court to retain jurisdiction to collect the outstanding fines
and restitutions after the probationary period has ended.
The bill is endorsed by the judicial counsel, the department of
corrections, and by the state association of prosecuting attorneys. Mr.
Speaker, I think that ends my presentation.
16

Floor Debate on H.B. 314, 48th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (February 16, 1989). No
questions were asked, and no further discussion was held.
Defendant claims that "had the legislature intended to eliminate statutory
limitations on probation, it would have eliminated the limitations instead of
redefining them." Br. Pet. At 13. But the Legislature did eliminate the mandatory
limits, and the sponsor's comments are entirely consistent with an intent to
eliminate the limits. According to the sponsor, Adult Probation and Parole was
having difficulty "managing the probationers within the statutory limits that [Utah]
currently [had]." Floor Debate on H.B. 314,48th Utah Legis., Gen. Sess. (February
16,1989). "The time limits on probations [made it] difficult to collect the fines and
restitution owing or to complete other programs within the probation period." Id.
The 1989 amendment eliminated those limits by removing the "strong mandate" of
the word "shall," Green, 757 P.2d at 464, and replacing it with the permissive word
"may," Mclntyre, 66 P.2d at 881. Accordingly, the courts now have discretion to
terminate probation at thirty-six months, but if there remains fines, restitution, or
uncompleted programs such as drug or sex offender treatment, then the court need
not terminate probation even if thirty-six months have passed without violation.4

4

The court cannot, of course, continue probation beyond the original term set
at sentencing without complying with the procedures in section 77-18-1(12) to
modify or extend probation.
17

D.

Cases construing section 77-18-1 since the 1989 amendment have
not directly addressed the question before this Court and thus are
of little precedential value.
Since the 1989 amendment, two cases from the court of appeals and one case

from this Court have referred to the time periods in section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) as
"maximum formal probation periods/ 7 State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982 (Utah
App. 1993); see also State v. Call, 1999 UT 4 2 , 1 1 1 , 980 P.2d 201; State v. McDonald,
2005 UT App 86, % 19,110 P.3d 149, cert, denied, 124 P.3d 251 (Utah 2005). None of
those cases, however, directly addressed the question of whether section 77-18l(10)(a)(i) imposes a maximum period of probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, ^
18 n.10.
Call considered the question of what the State must do to notify the offender
of a probation violation in order to extend probation before it terminates. See Call,
1999 UT 42, 1 8. McDonald confronted the question of whether a trial court's
sentence of two years formal probation followed by twelve and one-half years of
informal probation for convictions for fifty-eight class C misdemeanors, could be
construed as fifty-eight ninety-day periods of probation. See McDonald, 2005 UT
App 86, Yi

17-18.

Robinson questioned whether a trial court could retain

jurisdiction over a probationer until he pays his restitution. See Robinson, 860 P.2d at
983. In all three cases, the courts assumed without analysis that the probation terms
in section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) were maximum limits. As the question before this Court
18

was not directly addressed in those cases, they are of little precedential value in
resolving the instant case. 5 See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 18 n.10
E.

Alternatively, even if section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) requires termination
of felony probation after thirty-six months without a violation, it
does not render defendant's sentences illegal.
Alternatively, even if defendant is correct that the thirty-six month period in

section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) creates a mandatory termination date, defendant's sentences
are not illegal. Termination of probation under section 77-18-l(10)(a)(i) occurs only
"upon completion without violation of thirty-six months probation/' By its plain
terms, the statute is not activated until a felony offender has spent at least thirty-six
months on probation. If, at that point, he has completed the probation terms
without violation, the court must, under defendant's interpretation of the statute,
terminate his probation.
At sentencing, however, courts may anticipate that an offender will require
longer than thirty-six months to complete all the terms of probation and set the term
accordingly. See discussion, supra pts. LB & LC. If the offender does manage to
complete the terms of probation within the thirty-six month period, the longer term

5

Defendant also cites to State v. Denny in support of his claim that section 7718-l(10)(a)(i) sets maximum probation periods. Br. Pet. at 16-17. But Denny was
decided under the pre-1989 amendment version of the statute—the version that
used the word "shall" rather than "may." See State v. Denny, 776 P.2d 91,92 (Utah
App. 1989).
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at sentencing becomes of no effect because the court must, under defendant's
interpretation of the statute, terminate probation.
In the instant case, defendant has not yet completed thirty-six months of
probation without a violation. It is premature for him to invoke section 77-18l(10)(a)(i) to limit the term of his probation. Cf. State v. Mace, 921 P.2d 1372,1379
(Utah 1996). His sentences are thus legal, and this Court should affirm them.
II.

A TRIAL COURT MAY IMPOSE CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF
PROBATION
Alternatively, even if defendant is correct that a trial court can only impose

probation in thirty-six month increments, defendant's probation term of 144 months
is not illegal because it represents consecutive probation terms imposed in lieu of six
consecutive prison sentences.
At sentencing, the trial court sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms
for each conviction, but suspended the prison terms and placed defendant on
probation (R. 415:10-11). The judge then asked, "How far can I set [probation] with
six consecutive felonies?" (R. 415:11). An unidentified person said, "Well, I think
you can run it 36 months - " (R. 415:11). The judge responded, "Currently on each
one?" (R. 415:11). The prosecutor then pointed out that a co-defendant was on
probation for twelve years (R. 415:11). The judge then said, "That's what I'm

20

inclined to do in this particular case as well. Place you on probation for a period of
144-months, a 12-year period" (R. 415:11).6
Defendant claims a court may not impose consecutive terms of probation,
regardless of the severity or number of the crimes or the rehabilitative needs of the
defendant. Pet Br. at 17. He argues that section 77-18-1 (10) (a) (i) puts an absolute
cap of thirty-six months on probation and that courts may not impose consecutive
probation terms. Br. Pet. at 19. He asserts that "no matter how many felonies,
misdemeanors, or infractions a defendant is convicted of, any subsequent probation
still is limited by statute/' Pet. Br. at 19 Thus, in defendant's view, a person
convicted of five first degree felonies could be sentenced to five consecutive prison
terms of five years to life, but a lenient court could not impose more than thirty-six
months probation if it chose to impose probation.

6

Defendant asserts in his conclusion, without analysis or citation to the record
or any authority, that "the trial court provided no clear indication of its intent to
impose consecutive terms of probation." Br. Pet. at 27. This Court should refuse to
consider this claim because it is inadequately briefed. See West Jordan City v.
Goodman, 2006 UT 2 7 , f 2 9 (explaining that adequate briefing requires meaningful
legal analysis, including citation to authority, development of that authority, and
reasoned analysis based on that authority). Defendant's conclusory assertion fails to
explained the legal standard for imposing consecutive sentences or how the facts of
this case fail to meet that standard. Moreover, his claim ignores that the trial court
clearly imposed consecutive prison terms.
21

Defendant's reliance on section 77-18-1 is misplaced. That section does not
purport to regulate consecutive and concurrent sentencing. It only instructs courts
on how to start, modify, extend, and stop probation. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,

1118.
Consecutive sentencing is regulated by an entirely different title in the code:
Title 76. Section 76-3-201, states that "a court may sentence a person convicted of an
offense to any one of the following sentences or combination of them: (a) to pay a
fine... (c) to probation... [or] (d) to imprisonment." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201(2)
(West 2004). Under section 76-3-401 (West 2004), a court "shall determine, if a
defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offense." Thus when a person is
guilty of more than one offense, the court may impose concurrent or consecutive
fines, probations, and prison terms.
Defendant nevertheless claims that probation is not a "sentence" under
section 76-3-401 and that a trial court cannot therefore impose consecutive probation
periods. Br. Pet. at 17. He relies on section 77-18-1 (2)(a), which says that "the court
may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the sentence and place the
defendant on probation." Br. Pet. at 20. He explains that under that section,
probation is not a sentence, but rather, it is what takes the place of a suspended
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sentence. Br. Pet. at 20. He concludes that terms of probation are not subject to the
consecutive sentencing statute. Br. Pet. at 21.
In fact, the plain language of section 77-18-l(2)(a) permits multiple probation
terms. It allows the court to impose "probation" for "any offense or crime." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (2)(a). It follows that where a defendant is convicted of several
crimes, the court may impose a term of probation for each crime. It must then
determine, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 whether the probation terms will run
concurrently or consecutively.
Defendant also asserts that allowing courts to impose consecutive terms of
probation violates the double jeopardy and due process protections of the United
States and Utah Constitutions. Pet. Br. at 24-26. He argues that those protections
prohibit multiple punishments for the same offense or punishments that are
imposed and then later increased. Br. Pet. at 25. He then argues that construing
probation as a sentence in the consecutive sentencing statute would subject a
defendant to multiple sentences for a single offense. Br. Pet. at 24-25. That is, a
defendant who has his prison sentence suspended, is put on probation, and then has
probation revoked and the prison term reinstated would be subject to multiple
sentences. Pet. Br. at 24-25.
Defendant's claim is meritless. Defendant did not commit a single offense, he
committed six offenses. Moreover, double jeopardy protections are not implicated
23

by revoking probation and imposing the original prison term. See United State v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 137 (1980). "The Double Jeopardy Clause does not
provide the defendant with the right to know at any specific moment in time what
the exact limit of his punishment will turn out to be/' Id. These well established
maxims of constitutional law are not suddenly inapplicable merely because
probation is called a sentence for consecutive sentencing purposes.
Nor are defendant's due process rights violated by his probation. Defendant
chose to accept a twelve-year probation rather than be incarcerated for up to thirty
years.7 See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 19.
"'Probation' is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or
execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions." Utah
Code Ann. § 77-27-1(10) (West 2004). Probation is essentially a contract between the
defendant and the court. See Hurd v. State, 107 P.3d 314,333 (Alaska App. 2005). "If
the defendant does not like the terms prescribed by the court, he does not have to
accept them. And if he does agree to the terms set forth, he should abide by them."
State v. Allmendinger, 565 P.2d 1119,1121 (Utah 1977).

7

The court of appeals stated that defendant faced potential incarceration of
up to seventy years. See Wallace, 2005 UT App 434, % 19. Though defendant was
sentenced to six consecutive prison terms, his actually imprisonment would have
been limited to thirty years. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (6)(a).
24

If defendant did not want 144 months of probation, he could have declined
the court's offer and been incarcerated, where "he would have 'conceivably and
realistically been spending the rest of [his] life in prison." Wallace, 2005 UT App 434,
^ 19 (quoting the sentencing court).8
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm
the judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted May 10,2006.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

ziA^fi^
MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent

8

Defendant is a middle-aged man. Thirty years in prison is effectively the
rest of his life.
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DAVIS, Judge:
Hi
Gerald Steven Wallace appeals his conviction for various
violations of the Utah Uniform Securities Act (UUSA). See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (2000 & Supp. 2002) . We affirm.
BACKGROUND
^2
These criminal proceedings arise out of a Ponzi scheme
called "The Program."1 Defendant learned of The Program from Al
Anderson and Paul Stewart. Stewart claimed to be able to earn
commissions by facilitating money transfers from banks with
surplus cash reserves to banks with insufficient cash reserves.
To facilitate these transfers, however, Stewart asserted that he
needed to have a certain amount of money on deposit with the
bank.

1. A Ponzi scheme is a "fraudulent investment scheme in which
money contributed by later investors generates artificially high
dividends for the original investors, whose example attracts even
larger investments." Black's Law Dictionary 1180 (7th ed. 1999).

%3
Between August 2000 and March 2001, Defendant purchased at
least three homes in the state of Utah. The purchase of each
home was conditioned upon the seller agreeing to reinvest a
portion of the proceeds from the sale (in each case at least
$200,000) in an attorney trust account, which was initially held
at Attorney f s Title Guarantee Fund. Stewart claimed that he
would use the trust account money to facilitate the bank
transfers and to pay interest to the trust account beneficiaries
from his commissions.2 In fact, Stewart was embezzling funds
from the trust account, and each of the three sellers lost their
principal investment and received very little, if any, interest.
^|4
The State charged Defendant with selling unregistered
securities, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-7 (2000), -21 (Supp.
2002) , and selling securities without a license, see id. §§ 61-13(1)-(2) (2000), -21 (Supp. 2002). In support thereof, the State
offered evidence at trial that The Program was not registered as
a security, nor was Defendant licensed to sell securities.
Defendant, on the other hand, claims innocence because the record
contains no evidence that he knew he was selling securities.
f5
The State also charged Defendant with securities fraud. See
id. §§ 61-1-1(2) (2000), -21 (Supp. 2002). In support thereof,
the State offered evidence at trial that Defendant failed to
disclose several facts about The Program and those administering
it, including that: (1) Defendant declared bankruptcy in 1998,
(2) Anderson was convicted of a felony in 1986, (3) a lawsuit was
filed in 2000 against Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund and others
involved in The Program, (4) Stewart received a cease-and-desist
order from the Utah Division of Securities in 2 000, and (5) there
were certain risks involved in The Program. In his defense,
Defendant argued that he was unaware of the pending legal
troubles of Stewart and Attorney!s Title Guarantee Fund, and that
he did not know that his bankruptcy and Anderson's felony
conviction were relevant. Defendant also testified that,
contrary to their testimony, he did disclose the risks of The
Program to the sellers.3

2. The account would purportedly pay interest to the seller at a
fixed rate for two years and then return the principal to the
seller. The account supposedly generated enough interest to pay
not just the seller's interest, but also to pay the buyer's
mortgage.
3. Defendant was also charged with engaging in a pattern of
unlawful activity (racketeering), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-101601 to -1609 (1999 & Supp. 2002), which he does not address on
appeal.
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f6
Defendant was convicted by a jury on all counts. The trial
court sentenced Defendant to consecutive prison terms for each
count, but suspended the prison terms. The trial court placed
Defendant on probation for 144 months and ordered $626,000 in
restitution.4 Defendant obtained new counsel and filed a timely
notice of appeal.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
f7
Although Defendant characterizes his arguments as
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Defendant is
actually challenging the trial court's definition of willfulness,
which was taken from a statute and was given to the jury in the
form of an instruction. "The correct interpretation of a statute
is a question of law and is reviewed for correctness." State v.
Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Utah 1993).
H8
Based on the definition of willfulness that Defendant now
argues is appropriate, Defendant also claims that the State
failed to introduce sufficient evidence that his violations of
UUSA were willful, and that his counsel at trial was ineffective
because he failed to preserve this issue at trial. When
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will "uphold the
[jury's] decision if, upon reviewing the evidence and all
inferences that can reasonably be drawn from it, we conclude that
some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find that
the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a reasonable
doubt." State v. Dibello, 780 P.2d 1221, 1225 (Utah 1989).
"Where, as here, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
raised for the first time on appeal without a prior evidentiary
hearing, it presents a question of law." State v. Bryant, 965
P.2d 539, 542 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). However, "appellate review
of counsel's performance must be highly deferential; otherwise
the distorting effects of hindsight would produce too great a
temptation for courts to second-guess trial counsel's performance
on the basis of an inanimate record." Id. (quotations and
citations omitted).
1[9
Defendant finally asserts on appeal that his 144-month
probation violates Utah law. The illegality of a sentence is a
question of law, which we review for correctness. See State v.
Montoya. 825 P.2d 676, 679 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).

4. As part of probation, the trial court also barred Defendant
from acting as a fiduciary or participating in any real estate
transactions except for purchasing or selling a personal
residence.
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ANALYSIS
I.

Sufficiency of Evidence

HlO Defendant argues that the State presented insufficient
evidence of his willful intent to commit securities violations.
In support thereof, Defendant challenges the trial court's
definition of willfulness. The jury was instructed that
[a] defendant acts willfully if it was his
conscious objective or desire to engage in
the conduct or cause the result--not that it
was the defendant's conscious desire or
objective to violate the law, nor that the
defendant knew that he was committing fraud
in the sale of the security.
Although Defendant did not object to this instruction at trial,
he now argues that the instruction and resultant convictions were
erroneous.5 We disagree.
1[ll Before beginning our analysis, it is necessary to briefly
review the statutes at issue in this case. Defendant was charged
with one count of selling a security without a license, see Utah
Code Ann. § 61-1-3(1) -(2) (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to
act as a broker-dealer or an agent of a broker-dealer in Utah
without a license), one count of selling an unregistered
security, see id. § 61-1-7 (2000) (stating that it is unlawful to
offer or sell a security in Utah unless it is registered), and
three counts of securities fraud, see id. § 61-1-1(2) (2000)
(stating that it is unlawful for any person, in connection with
the offer or sale of any security, to "make any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact").
However, violations of these statutes are not criminal unless
they are done "willfully." Id. § 61-1-21(1), (2) (Supp. 2002).
While the UUSA does not define "willfully," Utah's Criminal Code
states that a person engages in conduct willfully "when it is his
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause
the result." IcL. § 76-2-103(1) (1999).
5. Under rule 19(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
"[ulnless a party objects to an instruction or the failure to
give an instruction, the instruction may not be assigned as error
except to avoid a manifest injustice." Utah R. Crim. P. 19(e).
The term "manifest injustice" is synonymous with the "plain
error" standard, wherein an appellant must show that an error
occurred, the error should have been obvious to the trial court,
and the error was harmful. See State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55,^4041, 82 P.3d 1106. Here, no error occurred.
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fl2 Defendant claims that the State failed to introduce evidence
that his sale of securities without a license and that his sale
of unregistered securities were willful, arguing that "[t]he
record contains absolutely no evidence that [Defendant] believed
he was selling securities." However, ignorance of the law is not
a defense to a crime. See id. § 76-2-304 (1999). Furthermore,
while no Utah case has directly addressed this issue, the
majority of jurisdictions have rejected arguments that a
defendant can avoid criminal liability for selling securities
without a license and selling unregistered securities by claiming
ignorance. See, e.cr. , Bayhi v. State, 629 So. 2d 782, 789 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1993) ("A specific criminal intent or guilty knowledge
that the law is being violated is not required to find criminal
violations of those sections of the Alabama Securities Act
prohibiting the sale of unregistered securities and requiring
registration as a securities dealer . . . ." (internal citations
omitted)); People v. Terranova, 563 P.2d 363, 367 (Colo. Ct. App.
1976) (holding that scienter need not be shown with regard to the
sale of securities without a license and sale of unregistered
securities); State v. Andresen, 773 A.2d 328, 346 (Conn. 2001)
(citing twelve jurisdictions, the court stated "[w]e hold, as
have the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, that the offense
of wilfully selling unregistered securities requires proof only
that the defendant intended to do the act prohibited by the
statute"); State v. Montgomery, 17 P.3d 292, 295 (Idaho 2001)
("[W]e join the majority of courts that have found scienter is
not required for violations of the securities registration and
licensing requirements."); Clarkson v. State, 486 N.E.2d 501, 507
(Ind. 1985) (affirming convictions for selling unregistered
securities and selling securities without being a registered
agent, the court stated "whether [defendant] was aware of the
Indiana securities laws is of no moment"); State v. Dumke, 901
S.W.2d 100, 103 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) ("To sustain a conviction
under the statute [governing registration of securities and
security agents], it is not necessary to find that the accused
realized his conduct was in violation of registration
requirements."); State v. Irons, 574 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Neb. 1998)
("Knowledge by a defendant that the item sold is a security is
not required in order to convict under the registration
provisions of the Uniform Securities Act."); State v. Sheets, 610
P.2d 760, 770 (N.M. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting defendant's
contention that, in order to commit the crime of selling
unregistered securities, one must have knowledge that the item
being sold is a security); State v. Goetz, 312 N.W.2d 1, 12-13
(N.D. 1981) (finding persuasive federal and state cases that hold
actual knowledge that a security is being sold in violation of
the law is not an element of a willful violation of securities
laws). Quite simply, knowledge by Defendant that the items sold
were securities was not required to convict him of willfully
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violating Utah Code section 61-1-3(1) and (2) and Utah Code
section 61-1-7. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 61-1-3 (1)- (2), -7.
^fl3 Defendant also challenges his securities fraud conviction,
see id. §§ 61-1-1(2), -21, arguing that the evidence of
willfulness was insufficient because he acted in "good faith" and
had an "honest" belief that The Program was legitimate. However,
Utah courts have refused to read scienter into section 61-1-1(2),
see State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 1360 (Utah 1993), but have
instead held that willfulness "does not require an intent to
violate the law or to injure another or acquire any advantage,"
id. at 1358 n.3. "The legislature has indicated that a person
acts willfully when it is his or her 'desire to engage in the
conduct that cause[s] the result.'" Id. at 1358 (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 76-2-103) (alteration in original). Therefore, " [t]o
act willfully in this context means to act deliberately and
purposefully, as distinguished from merely accidentally or
inadvertently." Id. at 13 58 n.3.
1[l4 Here, Defendant contends that he did not act "deliberately
and purposefully," id., because he did not know about the pending
legal troubles of Stewart and Attorney's Title Guarantee Fund and
because he did not know that his bankruptcy and Anderson's felony
conviction were material. In effect, Defendant is asking us to
hold that, to convict him of willfully committing securities
fraud, the State was required to prove that he knew of the
information that he failed to disclose (even though he did not
investigate the legitimacy of The Program) and that he knew that
such information was material.
^|15 We need not reach these issues.6 Regardless of Defendant's
knowledge regarding the other issues, Defendant concedes that he
knew of the risks of The Program, and he does not argue that he
believed that such information was not material. Instead,
Defendant simply argues that, "contrary to the sellers'
testimonies, he disclosed the risks to investors." Here, the
jury may simply have believed the sellers' testimony over
Defendant's. See Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278 (Utah
1987) (stating that a trier of fact "is entitled to give
conflicting opinions whatever weight he or she deems
appropriate"). Although the State alleged a number of material
misrepresentations and omissions, one material misrepresentation
or omission alone (like Defendant's failure to disclose the risks
of The Program to each of the three sellers) may be the basis for
a securities fraud conviction. See Utah Code Ann. § 61-1-1(2)

6. Although we do not reach the questions posited by Defendant,
we encourage the legislature to address these issues.
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(making it unlawful to "make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact" (emphases added)).
tl6 We will reverse a jury f s guilty verdict only if "the
evidence and its inferences are so inconclusive or inherently
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which
he was convicted." State v. Moore, 8 02 P.2d 73 2, 73 8 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (quotations and citation omitted). Thus, "so long as
some evidence and reasonable inferences support the jury's
findings, we will not disturb them." Id. Here, the State
specifically offered evidence that The Program was not registered
as a security and that Defendant was not licensed to sell
securities. The State also elicited testimony from each of the
sellers that Defendant failed to disclose the risks of The
Program. Clearly, "some evidence and reasonable inferences
support the jury ! s findings," id., and we therefore affirm the
convictions. Because we have determined that the State
introduced sufficient evidence that Defendant's violations of
UUSA were willful, the failure by Defendant's trial counsel to
preserve this issue does not constitute ineffective assistance.
See State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96,1(34, 989 P.2d 52 ("[T]he failure
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." (alteration
in original) (quotations and citation omitted)).
II.

Probation

^[17 Defendant claims that the trial court imposed an illegal
sentence when it suspended his prison term and placed him on
probation for 144 months, arguing that Utah Code section 77-181(10)(a)(i) limits probation to thirty-six months. See Utah Code
Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (2003).7 We disagree.
fl8 When construing the language of a statutory provision, we
"presume that the legislature used each word advisedly" and "will
not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already
there." Associated Gen. Contractors v. Board of Oil, Gas &
Mining, 2001 UT 112, ^[30, 38 P.3d 291 (quotations and citations
omitted). The trial court's authority to suspend a sentence and
impose probation is found in Utah Code section 77-18-1(2), which
states that on "conviction of any crime or offense, the court
may, after imposing sentence, suspend the execution of the
sentence and place the defendant on probation." Utah Code Ann.
7. Under Utah Code section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i), "[p]robation may
be terminated . . . upon completion without violation of [thirtysix] months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases."
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) (2003) .
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§ 77-18-1(2) (a) . Nothing in that section limits the court's
right to impose probation to a maximum of only thirty-six months.
And section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) simply states that a court "may"
terminate probation upon completion of thirty-six months
probation, so long as no violation has occurred within that time.
See id. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(i). Utah courts have long interpreted
the word "may" as permissive, not restrictive. See, e.g., Holmes
Dev. , LLC v. Cook, 2002 UT 38,1(25, 48 P. 3d 895 (interpreting an
insurance policy stating that the insurance company "may take any
appropriate action," the court concluded that the parties used
the word "may" "to set forth their intention that [the insurance
company] has the option to take appropriate action, but is not
required to do so"); State v. Mclntyre, 92 Utah 177, 66 P.2d 879,
881 (1937) ("[T]he word 'may' imports permission, privilege,
liberty to do, lack of restraint, a grant of opportunity or
power. It is never properly used in a denial, a restriction, or
a limitation . . . . " ) .
Therefore, the trial court here
certainly has discretion to terminate Defendant's probation after
thirty-six months (so long as no violations have occurred within
that time), 9 but is not required to limit probation to that time
frame.10

8. The legislature has also expressed its intent that Utah Code
section 77-18-1(10)(a)(i) be read as permissive rather than
restrictive. In State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the predecessor to section 77-181(10)(a)(i), which stated "'[u]pon completion without violation
of [eighteen] months probation in felony or class A misdemeanor
cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated from sentence.1"
Id. at 464 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp.
1984)). The court determined that the term "shall" was a strong
legislative mandate that required probation to terminate after
eighteen months. See id. In 1989, less than one year after
Green was decided, the Utah legislature amended the statute's
relevant language to use the term "may" instead of "shall."
Compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7) (a) (Supp. 1988) with id.
§ 77-18-1(7) (a) (Supp. 1989) (current version at id. § 77-181(10) (a) (i) (2003)) .
9. As one of the terms of probation, Defendant is required to
pay restitution in the amount of $626,000 (jointly and severally
with other defendants involved in The Program) pursuant to a
payment plan.
10. We are not bound by cases which, in dicta, assume without
deciding that Utah Code section 77-18-1(10) (a) (i) creates maximum
probationary periods. Seer e.g., State v. McDonald, 2005 UT App
86,^17-21, 110 P.3d 149; State v. Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 982
(Utah Ct. App. 1993).
20040877-CA

8

fl9 It should also be noted that Defendant here did not have to
accept the terms of his probation. See State v. Allmendinger,
565 P.2d 1119, 1121 (Utah 1977) ("If the defendant does not like
the terms prescribed by the court, he does not have to accept
them. And if he does agree to the terms set forth, he should
abide by them.") Defendant was convicted of four second degree
felonies (each carrying a one- to fifteen-year sentence) and two
third degree felonies (each carrying a zero- to five-year
sentence), creating a potential range of incarceration from four
to seventy years. In the judgefs own words, had Defendant
accepted incarceration over probation, he would have "conceivably
and realistically been spending the rest of [his] life in
prison." But Defendant did not choose incarceration. He chose
probation and thereby accepted its terms. Having accepted its
terms, he now must abide by them. See id.11
f20 Affirmed.

f21 WE CONCUR:

.<j£tK M. B i l l i n g s ,

Presiding Judge

(f

J

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge ^ ^

11. Defendant also asserts that the law does not permit a judge
to impose consecutive terms of probation. Having determined that
the imposition of 144 months of probation was not in error, we
need not reach this issue.
20040877-CA
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3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
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SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
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Case No: 021910910 FS

GERALD STEVEN WALLACE,
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Judge:
Date:
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Septeinber 27, 2004

PRESENT
Clerk:
marcyt
Prosecutor: BARLOW, CHARLENE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s) : SIMMS, CLAYTON A
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: November 10, 1960
Video
Tape Number:
11:20
CHARGES
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty
SECURITIES FRAUD - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty
SECURITIES FRAUD (amended) - 2 nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty
SALE OF UNREGISTERED SECURITY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty
UNREGISTERED SECURITIES AGENT - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty
PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 08/12/2004 Guilty
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Case No: 021910910
Date:
Sep 27, 2004
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SECURITIES FRAUD a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah
State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of SALE OF UNREGISTERED
SECURITY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of UNREGISTERED SECURITIES
AGENT a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State
Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
Based on the defendant's conviction of PATTERN OF UNLAWFUL ACTIVITY
a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the
Utah State Prison.
The prison term is suspended.
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Case No: 021910910
Date:
Sep 27, 2004

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
The counts in this case are consecutively.

ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 144 month(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole,
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult
Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay restitution in the amount of $62 6,000 jointly
and severally.
Counsel and defendant will form a stipulated plan of payment within
60 days. If a stipulation cannot be reached, a hearing will be
set.
Restitution is to be paid directly to the Attorney General's
Office.
The Court appoints LDA for any appeals defendant may make.
Defendant is not to act as a fiduciary in the State of Utah.
Defendant is barred from the involvement/execution of any real
property transactions as either a principal or as a third party
with the exception of the sale or acquisition of his primary
residence.

Page 3

"bS"b

Case No: 021910910
Date:
Sep 27, 2004
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For the Defendant:
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1

SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 27, 2004

2

JUDGE DENO HIMONAS PRESIDING

3

P R O C E E D I N G S

4

MR. SIMMS:

Can we call the Gerald Wallace matter?

5

THE COURT:

Mr. Wallace.

6

MS. BARLOW:

7

MR. SIMMS:

Clayton Simms on behalf of Mr. Wallace.

8

THE COURT:

Mr. Wallace is present.

9

Charlene Barlow on behalf of the State,

I'll note for

the record, I've received a fairly extensive amount of

10

correspondence from Mr. Wallace's family and friends.

11

taken the opportunity to review each and every one of those

12

letters as well as the pre-sentence report.

13
14

I've

Counsel, have you all received the pre-sentence
report?

15

MR. SIMMS:

I have, Your Honor.

16

MS. BARLOW:

17

THE COURT

Had a chance to go through it?

18

MR. SIMMS

Yes.

19

THE COURT

Any corrections that need to be made in

We did.

20 I the pre-sentence report?
21

MR. SIMMS:

Just one correction, Judge, on the second

22

page, rather than all not guilty verdict, they're all guilty

23

verdict.

Actually it's on the —

24

THE COURT:

I'm not following you, where are you?

25

MR. SIMMS:

Does it state that they're all not guilty

1

rather than guilty.

2

THE COURT:

Do you want to approach Mr. Simms and

3

show me what you're - those are the pleas, those aren't the

4

verdicts, those are the pleas.

5

MR. SIMMS:

There's no corrections then.

6

THE COURT:

Anything else?

7

MR. SIMMS:

No, Your Honor, in terms of corrections.

8

MS. BARLOW:

9

sentence writer neglected to include Calvin Paul Stewart as—

10

THE COURT:

11

MS. BARLOW:

12

I would indicate that on Page 5 the pre-

Pardon me?
Calvin Paul Stewart as a (inaudible) he

went to trial was found guilty and is currently incarcerated.

13

THE COURT:

Thank you.

14

MS. BARLOW: We were.

15

THE COURT: All right.

16

MR. SIMMS:

It seems like we were short.

Mr. Simms, you may proceed?

There are no more corrections but I do

17

have some comments.

18

has heard the trial but I would say that Mr. Wallace has a

19

number of letters of support and that's just an indication of

20

the type of person that he is. Time and time again they say

21

that he's an honorable person.

22

this case. He/s working graveyard shifts3

23

doing we 11 theire and he' s doing that because he's going to

24

school.

25

I won't go through the facts, the Court

He's been doing well despite
at

Hollywood Video,

He's taking;, what is it — given his work schedule.
THE COURT:

I've read the file carefully, Mr. Simms
2

1

MR. SIMMS:

In addition to that, he's working as an

2

actor in Savior of the World.

3

he's grown.

4

again and doing well.

5

You may notice his beard that

He's in a Christmas play as well.

He's working

Again, this has been a tragedy for a number of

6

people, including Mr. Wallace.

7

he maxed out credit cards.

8

think his portion of that was $60,000.

9

He's had issues of depression because of this case but he's now

10
11
12

He lost the equity in his home,

He and his family lost $480,000. I
He's doing well now.

on Wellbutrin and doing well in therapy.
THE COURT:

It sounds like, Mr. Wallace, you had

issues of depression that remain in this case?

13

MR. WALLACE:

14

THE COURT: Am I wrong that there was an issue

15
16

No sir, I don't.

involving a child?
MR. SIMMS:

I think there was issues of childhood

17

abuse but I don't know if there's necessary depression.

18

think Mr. Wallace was a victim of childhood abuse but has done

19

well with that and I think he's getting therapy relating to

20

this fraud and the damage that it's caused his family.

21

THE COURT:

I

I'm referring to the - not the

22

allegations, but at about the time that you and your family had

23

to deal with these legal matters, your oldest daughter died in

24

a car crash?

25

MR. WALLACE:

That's right.

1

THE COURT:

And that that's the reference that I was

2

making, causing you some other emotional issues, understandably

3

causing other emotional issues.

4

MR. WALLACE:

5

THE COURT:

It was afterwards. I'm sorry.

6

MR. SIMMS:

I think if I could get maybe more to the

7

point, is that the recommendation of 30 days jail is—

8
9

THE COURT:

MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor, I think that given that, I

think there might be issues in terms of restitution.

12
13

Mr. Wallace is not going to jail

(inaudible).

10
11

That was after this.

THE COURT:

Restitution, we f re going to have a long

discussion about.

14

MR. SIMMS:

The difficulty that we have with the

15

restitution is that he has, in fact, lost everything, he didn't

16

make an economic gain from this.

17

THE COURT:

Mr. Wallace isn't going to jail, Mr.

18

Wallace is going to pay restitution if he's responsible for

19

restitution.

20

That's really not optional.

MR. SIMMS:

In terms of - maybe we didn't understand.

21

Is the Court going to order the restitution in this case or is

22

this Court looking at something wider or...

23

THE COURT:

It will be part of the order in this

24

case.

Part of the condition for probation will be restitution

25

and I understand given the amount, we're going to have to talk

1

about it and work it out but there is going to be a restitution

2

requirement. I want to hear from the State first.

3
4

Mr. Barlow, if you want to address the issue of jail
you can but you're going to be whistling in the wind.

5

MS. BARLOW:

I wasn't intending to anyway, Your

6

Honor, and why waste my breath?

7

Court a couple of matters that did not come out at trial.

8

is is that Mr. Wallace did in 1986 take (inaudible) and also

9

going back and looking back at the bank records from the Clay

I do want to indicate to the
One

10

Harrison account and also from the Alvin Anderson account, both

11

people involved in this, that there was, oh, probably over

12

$50,000 worth of checks that were made out to Mr. Wallace.

13

just wanted to indicate that because as I said—

I

14

THE COURT:

15

and convicted of these crimes.

16

I want to work out some kind of workable order.

17

to order jail.

18

any time talking to me about but how do we set up, how do we

19

set up restitution so that Mr. Wallace isn't set up to fail?

20

I think - Mr. Wallace, you were charged
Restitution is appropriate and
I'm not going

It's just not something that anybody has spent

MR. SIMMS:

Your Honor, given his situation working

21

at Hollywood Video, having limited means and having seven kids

22

at home, I think it would be difficult for him to pay anything

23

more than, say, $50 a month.

24

a lifetime payment.

25

know how he can—

I know that that would be sort of

I think he understands that but I don't

1

THE COURT:

We're talking about nearly $1 million, I

2

mean, $626,000 and certainly there's going to be joint and

3

several liability.

4

responsible for that as well but $50 a month is not an option.

5

The co-defendants are going to be

MR. SIMMS: And I don't know how much he can do.

I

6

don't think that he can work significantly towards the

7

$626,000.

8

well as other attorneys to get a settlement and to make sure

9

that these people are taken care of.

I know that he's worked together with Dan Jackson as

I think there's been some

10

work with that and I know that Mr. Van Roo's attorney, Mr. Dan

11

Jackson is here and I think he would like to speak and maybe he

12

could comment on where they're at in terms of restitution.

13

MR. JACKSON:

Your Honor, I apologize for my

14

appearance but I didn't realize that this was on the calendar.

15

I represent Rich Van Roo and the co-counsel for approximately

16

60 other victims of this fraud.

17

fraud for about two and a half years as Ms. Barlow will testify

18

to and I think I have the best handle on the case as probably

19

any one.

20

is that at an early stage Steve Wallace came forward and

21

assisted us in obtaining material information against the co-

22

defendants and against the companies that employed the co-

23

defendants.

24

people that he was involved with to come in and talk to us.

25

a result in part of his assistance, we were able to fashion a

I've been investigating the

One of the things that's been important in this case

In addition, he was instrumental in soliciting the
As

1

case against approximately 42 defendants and filed that in

2

federal court as a racketeering case.

3

some initial settlements in that matter that has brought some

4

restitution to the victims including the people that were

5

victimized in relationship to Mr. Wallace.

6

We have accomplished

I will note that Clay Harrison has assisted us in a

7

similar way.

None of the other defendants in this matter have

8

done that and I don't think that we would have the cases that

9

we had without his assistance.

10

THE COURT; No.

11

Ms. Barlow?

12

MS. BARLOW:

Any questions?

We all hope that through this federal

13

lawsuit against especially the parent company of Attorney's

14

Titlef that money sufficient will come back to pay off all of

15

these victims.

16

defendants are in the same or similar circumstance as Mr.

17

Wallace.

18

getting out anytime soon and will not be making any

19

restitutionary payments.

20
21

The problem being, of course, all of these

Some of them are in prison and probably won't be

THE COURT:

What is Mr. Harrison's restitution

stipulation?

22

MS. BARLOW:

Well, I'm sorry to laugh but it's

23

interesting because we had contemplated with Judge Burton that

24

he would be making some kind of restitutionary, monthly

25

payment.

His attorney said no, that's not what Judge Burton

1

said and that's not what the agreement was.

2

suppose to help in the civil lawsuits.

3

the court to review that.

4
5

THE COURT:

So, I certainly can ask

That remains to be seen I guess is what

you're saying.

6

MS. BARLOW:

7

THE COURT:

Right.
I appreciate your comments.

8

your comments.

9

is Mr. Wallace's cooperation.

10

He was just

I appreciate

The reason we're talking about zero jail time

I mean if there were no cooperation, given, you know,

11

these counts Mr. Wallace, you'd conceivably be spending the

12

rest of your life in the Utah State Prison given the number of

13

convictions that there are but because of your cooperation, I

14

think that's why we're only looking at 30-day recommendation to

15

begin with and why I'm not interested in imposing a jail

16

sentence but, you know, there's still victims out there and

17

restitution is appropriate,

18

that like I said doesn't put you in a position to fail because

19

that's not my intent but still recognize that you have an

20

obligation.

I want to come up with something

21

MR. JACKSON:

May I be excused?

22

THE COURT:

23

Ms. Barlow, give me a recommendation.

24

MS. BARLOW:

Yes, of course.

Your Honor, as I recall the restitution

25 I statute - well, you know, we would ask that he be ordered to
8

1

make restitution, complete restitution, that it be joint and

2

several and, of course, if it's paid through the federal

3

lawsuit, like I say, everybody would be thrilled with that.

4

can't speak for how much he can pay per month.

5

out at a lesser amount but as he gets better employment, we

6

could certainly review these and maybe have—

I

Maybe he starts

7

THE COURT:

8

Mr. Wallace, do you want to address the Court before

9

Here's what I'm going to do.

I hear you.

I impose sentence?

10

MR. WALLACE:

Yes, Your Honor, is that's all right.

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. WALLACE:

It is alright.
I don't know if it's applicable and you

13

can tell me if it matters or not.

14

I just engaged in light heartedly or flippantly or without any

15

due diligence on my part.

16
17

THE COURT:

This was not something that

I was with you through the trial, Mr.

Wallace.

18

MR. WALLACE:

Not everything got presented in the

19

trial as far as my due diligence and if you say it doesn't

20

matter, I understand.

21
22

THE COURT:

It doesn't.

I mean,

that's...

23

MR. WALLACE:

24

THE COURT:

25

You were convicted.

Yes, Your Honor, that's fine then.
I understand that in the face of what

we've heard before that you maintained that you had a good

1

faith basis for doing what you did and I appreciate that.

2

MR. WALLACE:

3

THE COURT:

4

And I don't-

That doesn't lift the fact that you have

restitution obligation.

5

MR. WALLACE:

And the point that I wanted to bring up

6

was it doesn't mitigate my acknowledgment of the loss and

7

suffering that others have—

8
9

THE COURT:

You have behaved as a gentleman

throughout the process.

I appreciate that.

As I've said

10

before, but for your cooperation we wouldn't be talking about

11

no jail sentence.

12

and realistically been spending the rest of your life in

13

prison.

14

need to be made and what I'm inclined to do is with respect to

15

the events of securities fraud, looking at three separate

16

charges of securities fraud, counsel, am I right?

We'd be talking about you would conceivably

That's just not going to happen.

17

MR. SIMMS: Yes.

18

MS. BARLOW:

19

But restitution does

Yes, three of fraud and then the other

second degree is a pattern of unlawful activity.

20

THE COURT:

All right.

With respect to the four

21

second degree felonies, the three counts of securities fraud

22

and the pattern of unlawful activity, second degree felonies, I

23

proposed the 1 to 15 year terms in the Utah State Prison, no

24

fines.

I'm going to have them run consecutively and the same

25 J with the sale of the unregistered security, unregistered
10

1

securities agent, the third degree felonies, I'm going to

2

impose the zero to five year terms and have them run

3

consecutively as well but I'm going to suspend the entirety of

4

all of the sentences.

5

any money go towards restitution in this case rather than the

6

payment of any fine.

7

months.

8

want it longer intentionally so that we're giving you as long

9

an opportunity as possible to make restitution payments.

10

I'm not imposing a fine.

I don't want you on probation for 36

Probation is going to be a lot longer than that.

I

How

far can I set it with six consecutive felonies?

11

MR. ?:

12

THE COURT: Currently on each one?

13

MS. BARLOW:

14

I'd rather see

Well, I think you can run it 36 months -

Mr. Harrison is on probation for 12

years.

15

THE COURT:

That's what I'm inclined to do in this

16

particular case as well.

Place you on probation for a period

17

of 144 months, a 12-year period.

18

restitution.

19

$626,000.

20

Utah and you're barred from the involvement and execution of

21

any real property transactions as either principal or third

22

party with the exception of the seller acquisition of your

23

primary residence; however, with respect to restitution, what I

24

want is to give the state, Ms. Barlow, Mr. Simms, Mr. Wallace

I'm going to order

You're jointly and severally liable for the

You're not to act as a fiduciary in the state of

25 J collectively an opportunity to sit down in the next 45 days to
11

1

come up with a reasonable restitution plan recognizing, Ms.

2

Barlow, that it's highly, highly unlikely - I'm not talking

3

about one in which he makes complete restitution by himself.

4

It's just not possible but I want something that's rational,

5

that doesn't set Mr. Wallace up to fail but at the same time

6

recognizes the severity of the charges of which he was

7

convicted.

8

brought before me.

9

County at the time but I want it in front of me.

I'm going to ask you to do that and have this
I may not be here.

I may be in Summit
I want to

10

keep possession of this particular case.

11

down or we can do it up there within 60 days and if you can't

12

reach an agreement, I'm ultimately going to fashion one myself.

13

I'm just hopeful that, you know, counsel you're both very

14

reasonable so I'm certain you can reach some agreement.

15

MS. BARLOW:

I'm happy to come

Your Honor, could I suggest that the

16

payment of restitution be through our office?

17

Adult Probation and Parole usually assesses a $30 per month and

18

if we do it through our office we have a federal (inaudible)

19

and we don't have to—

20

THE COURT:

21

MS. BARLOW:

22

THE COURT:

23

appreciate that.

24

MR. ?:

25

MS. BARLOW:

I know that

Certainly, absolutely,
No offense to AP&P.
No, I'm sure AP&P would frankly

Yeah, that would be great.
Did the Court want to set that 60 days

1

at this time or what?

2

THE COURT:

No, I think what we'll do - if you can

3

reach an agreement, a stipulated restitution plan, present it

4

to me for review and signature.

5

ask the State to file a motion within 60 days and schedule a

6

restitution hearing.

If you can't then I'm going to

7

Mr. Simms, Mr. Wallace, questions?

8

MR. SIMMS:

9

Your Honor, the only other issue - well,

in terms of just having Mr. Wallace advised about his appeal

10

rights, I think that it might be appropriate to have an LDA

11

appointed for the purposes of just informing him of his appeal

12

rights.

13

stages Mr. Wallace informed me of a desire to appeal. That was

14

early on and I think maybe that needs to take place so somebody

15

could advise him about that.
THE COURT:

16
17

I don't know if that's appropriate.

All right.

have Mr. Wallace step back.

I know in earlier

I'm going to appoint, let's

I need the affidavit filled out.

18

MR. SIMMS

I have that, Your Honor, filled out.

19

THE COURT

You have?

20

MR. SIMMS

Yes.

21

THE COURT:

All right.

I 'm going to appoint LDA for
iiill
You i

be able

22

Mr. Wall ace and give ;you a referral to LDA.

23

to meet with them and talk to them concerning any potential

24

app)eals.

25

MR. WALLACE :

Thank you, Your Honor.
13

1
2

THE COURT:

MS. BARLOW:

4

THE COURT:

6 I

Is there anything else in

this particular matter?

3
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All right.

Not on this matter.
Mr. Wallace, anything else?

Good luck to

you.
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded)
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§76-3-105

CRIMINAL CODE

§ 7 6 - 3 - 1 0 5 . Infractions
(1) Infractions are not classified.
(2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is expressly designated
and any offense defined outside this code which is not designated as a felony or
misdemeanor and for which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-105.
Library References
Criminal Law <S=»28.
Westlaw Key Number Search: 110k28.
CJ.S. Criminal Law § 9.
United States Code Annotated
Petty offense defined, federal crimes and offenses, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 19.

PART 2. SENTENCING
§ 7 6 - 3 - 2 0 1 . Definitions—Sentences or combination of sentences allowed—
Civil penalties—Hearing
(1) As used in this section:
(a) ' 'Conviction1' includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of
committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil action
arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal
activities and includes the money equivalent of property taken, destroyed,
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses including earnings and medical
expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary
damages to a victim, and payment for expenses to a governmental entity for
extradition or transportation and as further defined in Title 77, Chapter 38a,
Crime Victims Restitution Act.
(e)(i) "Victim" means any person who the court determines has suffered
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a
person convicted of an offense to any one of the following sentences or
combination of them:
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(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal or disqualification from public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without parole; or
(f) to death.
(3)(a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for'contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4)(a) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court
shall order that the defendant make restitution to the victims, or for conduct for
which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement.
(b) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow
the criteria and procedures as provided in Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime
Victims Restitution Act.
(5)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall
order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses
if the defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one county to another
within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending criminal
charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime,
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or on a subsequent failure
to appear a warrant is issued for an infraction; or
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order.
(c)(i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (5)(a)(i) shall be calculated according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported; and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (5)(c)(i) applies to each
defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually
transported in a single trip.
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(d) If a defendant has been extradited to this state under Title 77, Chapter
30, Extradition, to resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of
criminal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court may,
in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the defendant
make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the
extradition.
(6)(a) In addition to any other sentence the court may impose, the court shall
order the defendant to pay court-ordered restitution to the county for the cost
of incarceration in the county correctional facility before and after sentencing
if:
(i) the defendant is convicted of criminal activity that results in incarceration in the county correctional facility; and
(ii)(A) the defendant is not a state prisoner housed in a county correctional facility through a contract with the Department of Corrections; or
(B) the reimbursement does not duplicate the reimbursement provided
under Section 64-13c-301 if the defendant is a state prisoner housed in a
county correctional facility as a condition of probation under Subsection
77-18-1(8).
(b)(i) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) are:
(A) the daily core inmate incarceration costs and medical and transportation costs established under Section 64-13c-302; and
(B) the costs of transportation services and medical care that exceed
the negotiated reimbursement rate established under Subsection
64-13c-302(2).
(ii) The costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a) do not include
expenses incurred by the county correctional facility in providing reasonable accommodation for an inmate qualifying as an individual with a
disability as defined and covered by the federal Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. 12101 through 12213, including medical and mental
health treatment for the inmate's disability.
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for the courtordered restitution under this Subsection (6), the court shall consider the
criteria provided under Subsections 77-38a-302(5)(c)(i) through (iv).
(d) If on appeal the defendant is found not guilty of the criminal activity
under Subsection (6)(a)(i) and that finding is final as defined in Section
76-1-304, the county shall reimburse the defendant for restitution the defendant paid for costs of incarceration under Subsection (6)(a).
(7)(a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the
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court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to the time set
for sentencing.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition
of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in the case,
the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports received under
Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the
prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence introduced at the
sentencing hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and reasons
for imposing the upper or lower term.
(e) In determining a just sentence, the court shall consider sentencing
guidelines regarding aggravating and mitigating circumstances promulgated
by the Sentencing Commission.
(8) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnapping, rape
of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a
child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and if the
charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by the
defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be
sentenced to the highest minimum term in state prison. This Subsection (8)
takes precedence over any conflicting provision of law.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-201; Laws 1979, c. 69, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 1; Laws
1983, c. 85, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 88, § 3; Laws 1984, c. 18, § 1; Laws 1986, c. 156, § 1;
Laws 1987, c. 107, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 81, § 1; Laws 1992, c. 142, § 1; Laws 1993, c.
17, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 19; Laws 1995, c. Ill, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995,
c. 117, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 301, § 1, eff. May \, 1995; Laws 1995, c.
337, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, 1st Sp. Sess., c. 10, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws
1996, c. 40, § 1, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 98, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws
1996, c. 241, §§ 2, 3, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws 1998, c. 149, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws
1999, c. 270, § 15, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2001, c. 209, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws
2002, c. 35, § 4, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 280, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2002, c. 35, substantially rewrote this
section that formerly provided:
"(1) As used in this section:
"(a) 'Conviction' includes a:
"(0 judgment of guilt; and
"(ii) plea of guilty.
"(b) 'Criminal activities' means any offense of
which the defendant is convicted or any other
criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with
or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.
"(c) 'Pecuniary damages' means all special
damages, but not general damages, which a
person could recover against the defendant in a
civil action arising out of the facts or events
constituting the defendant's criminal activities
and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed,

and losses including earnings and medical expenses.
"(d) 'Restitution' means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim,
including the accrual of interest from the time
of sentencing, insured damages, and payment
for expenses to a governmental entity for extradition or transportation and as further defined
in Subsection (4)(c).
"(e)(i) 'Victim' means any person who the
court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal
activities.
"(ii) 'Victim' does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activities.
"(2) Within the limits prescribed by this
chapter, a court may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the following
sentences or combination of them:
"(a) to pay a fine;
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§ 76-3—401.

Concurrent or consecutive sentences—Limitations—Definition

(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences
for the offenses. The court shall state on the record and shall indicate in the
order of judgment and commitment:
(a) if the sentences imposed are to r u n concurrently or consecutively to
each other; and
(b) if the sentences before the court are to run concurrently or consecutively with any other sentences the defendant is already serving.
(2) In determining whether state offenses are to run concurrently or consecutively, the court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the offenses, the
number of victims, and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant.
(3) The court shall order that sentences for state offenses run consecutively if
the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole,
unless the court finds and states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
(4) If a written order of commitment does not clearly state whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently, the Board of Pardons and
Parole shall request clarification from the court. Upon receipt of the request,
the court shall enter a clarified order of commitment stating whether the
sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently.
(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode as defined in Section 76-1-401.
(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of
all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonment, except as
provided under Subsection (6)(b).
(b) The limitation under Subsection (6)(a) does not apply if:
(i) an offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the death
penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
(ii) the defendant is convicted of an additional offense based on conduct
which occurs after his initial sentence or sentences are imposed.
(7) The limitation in Subsection (6)(a) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more offenses, all of which
were committed prior to imposition of the defendant's initial sentence; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state other than the
present sentencing court or by a court of another state or federal jurisdiction,
and the conduct giving rise to the present offense did not occur after his
initial sentencing by any other court.
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(8) When the limitation of Subsection (6)(a) applies, determining the effect of
consecutive sentences and the manner in which they shall be served, the Board
of Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has been
committed for a single term that consists of the aggregate of the validly
imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-year limitation, the
maximum sentence is considered to be 30 years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively, the minimum term, if
any, constitutes the aggregate of the validly imposed minimum terms.
(9) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently being served, the term that
provides the longer remaining imprisonment constitutes the time to be served.
(10) This section may not be construed to restrict the number or length of
individual consecutive sentences that may be imposed or to affect the validity of
any sentence so imposed, but only to limit the length of sentences actually
served under the commitments.
(11) This section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court to
impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
(12) As used in this section, "imprisoned" means sentenced and committed
to a secure correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1, the sentence has
not been terminated or voided, and the person is not on parole, regardless of
where the person is located.
Laws 1973, c. 196, § 76-3-401; Laws 1974, c. 32, § 7; Laws 1989, c. 181, § 1; Laws
1994, c. 13, § 21; Laws 1995, a. 139, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1997, c. 283, § 1, eff.
May 5, 1997; Laws 1999, c. 275, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2002, c. 129, § 1, eff. July
1, 2002.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2002, c. 129, substantially rewrote this
section that formerly provided:
"(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant
has been adjudged guilty of more than one
felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or
consecutive sentences for the offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall r u n concurrently
unless the court states in the sentence that they
shall run consecutively.
"(2) The court shall order that sentences for
state'offenses run consecutively if the later offense is committed while the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds and
states on the record that consecutive sentencing
would be inappropriate.
"(3) If an order of commitment does not
clearly state whether the sentences shall run
consecutively or concurrently, and the Board of
Pardons and Parole has reason to believe that
the later offense occurred while the person was
imprisoned or on parole for the earlier offense,
the board shall request clarification from the
court. Upon receipt of the request, the court

shall enter an amended order of commitment
stating whether the sentences are to run consecutively or concurrently,
« ( 4 ) A c o m t s h a l l c o n s i d e r m e gravity and
^ ^ ^
c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h e offenses a n d m e
c h a r a c t e r , and rehabilitative needs of the defen, . . , .
. .
, ,,
. .
dant m
d e t e m i n i n g whether to impose consecutlve
sentences.
"(5) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section 7 6 - 1 - 4 0 1 .
"(6)(a) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate maximum of all sentences
imposed may not exceed 30 years imprisonexcept as provided under Subsection
ment,
(6)(b).
_.
...
.
.
.
,,\, \
(in.
0 .
, *> tte R a t i o n under Subsection (6)(a)
do s n o t a
^
PPty ±
"(0 an offense for which the defendant is
sentenced authorizes the death penalty or a
maximum sentence of life imprisonment; or
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77-18-4.
77-18-5.
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-18-6.5.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.
77-18-8.3.
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77-18-14.
77-18-15.
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Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—Supervision—Presentence investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—Terms and
conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring.
Repealed.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence—Term—Construction.
Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons and
Parole.
Judgment of death—Method is lethal injection—Exceptions for use of firing
squad.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a hen.
Liability of rescued person for costs of emergency response.
Costs imposed on defendant—Restrictions.
Fine not paid—Commitment.
Special condition of sentence during incarceration—Penalty.
Special condition of probation—Penalty.
Definitions.
Petition—Expungement of records of arrest, investigation, and detention—
Eligibility conditions—No filing fee.
Petition—Expungement of conviction—Certificate of eligibility—Fee—Notice—Written evaluation—Obj ections—Hearing.
Grounds for denial of certificate of eligibility—Effect of prior convictions.
Hearing—Standard of proof—Exception.
Order to expunge—Distribution of order—Redaction—Receipt of order—
Administrative proceedings—Division requirements.
Retention of expunged records—Agencies.
Penalty.
Retroactive application.

§ 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence—Pleas held in abeyance—Probation—
Supervision—Presentence
investigation—Standards—Confidentiality—
Terms and conditions—Termination, revocation, modification, or extension—Hearings—Electronic monitoring
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction of
any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend the
execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court
may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private
organization; or
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(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
(b)(i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the
sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(iii) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3)(a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards
shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(iii) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what level
of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to
the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an annual basis
for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures to
implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and other
criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5)(a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence
for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence
investigation report from the department or information from other sources
about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the defendant in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act.
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(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6)(a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to
the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the
prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing.
Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have
not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall
be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an
additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report
with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be
resolved, the court shall make a determination of relevance and accuracy on
the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be
waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence, or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the
defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs;
(iii) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation by
the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
.. (vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use of
electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including
the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with interest
in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims Restitution Act;
and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appropriate; and
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(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation
diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the defendant's
own expense if the defendant has not received the diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance with
Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance
with Subsection (10).
(10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions.
(ii)(A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under
Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account
receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the
limited purpose of enforcing the payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record in the
registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already recorded and
immediately transfer responsibility to collect the account to the Office of
State Debt Collection.
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of
court.
(b)(i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of State
Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all
cases when termination of supervised probation will occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(ll)(a)(i) Any time served-by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke
probation does not constitute service of time toward the total probation term
unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
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toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the
hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant
by the court.
(12)(a)(i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a
hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a
finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b)(i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court that
authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is
justified.
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the affidavit
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked,
modified, or extended.
(c)(i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the
hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance,
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be
represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for
him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d)(i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of
the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to questioning
by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e)(i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
that the entire probation term commence anew.
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
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(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at the
state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the. department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or the
subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that
the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime
including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the
victim or the victim's household.
(15)(a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in Sections
76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred to
the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16)(a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the use of
electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order of the
court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions which
require:
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(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all times;
and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this section,
it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device on the
defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the residence of
the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to be
indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in this
section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
Laws 1980, c. 15, § 2; Laws 1981, c. 59, § 2; Laws 1982, c. 9, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 47,
§ 1; Laws 1983, c. 68, § 1; Laws 1983, c. 85, § 2; Laws 1984, c. 20, § 1; Laws 1985, c.
212, § 17; Laws 1985, c. 229, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 114, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 226, § 1;
Laws 1990, c. 134, § 2; Laws 1991, c. 66, § 5; Laws 1991, c. 206, § 6; Laws 1992, c.
14, § 3; Laws 1993, c. 82, § 7; Laws 1993, c. 220, § 3; Laws 1994, c. 13, § 24; Laws
1994, c. 198, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 230, § 1; Laws 1995, c. 20, § 146, eff. May 1, 1995;
Laws 1995, c. 117, § 2, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 184, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1995, c. 301, § 3, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1995, c. 337, § 11, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws
1995, c. 352, § 6, eff. May 1, 1995; Laws 1996, c. 79, § 103, eff. April 29, 1996; Laws
1997, c. 390, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 94, § 10, eff. May 4, 1998; Laws
1999, c. 279, § 8, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 287, § 7, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws
2001, c. 137, § 1, eff. April 30, 2001; Laws 2002, c. 35, § 7, eff. May 6, 2002; Laws
2002, 5th Sp. Sess., c. 8, § 137, eff. Sept. 8, 2002; Laws 2003, c. 290, § 3, eff. May 5,
2003.
Historical and Statutory Notes
Laws 2002, c. 35, modified the statutory refer"(iii) identify any physical injury suffered by
ences at the end of subsecs. (5)(c) and (8)(a)(ix), the victim as a result of the offense along with
and rewrote subsec. (5)(b) that formerly provid- its seriousness and permanence;
ed:
"(iv) describe any change in the victim's per"(b) The presentence investigation report sonal welfare or familial relationships as a reshall include a victim impact statement describ- suit of the offense;
ing the effect of the crime on the victim and the
"(v) identify any request for psychological
victim's family. The victim impact statement services initiated by the victim or the victim's
shall:
family as a result of the offense; and
"(i) identify all victims of the offense;
"(vi) contain any other information related to
"(ii) include a specific statement of the rec- the impact of the offense upon the victim or the
ommended amount of complete restitution as victim's family and any information required by
defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4), accompa- Section 77-38a-203 that is relevant to the trial
nied by a recommendation from the department court's sentencing determination."
regarding the payment of court-ordered restituLaws 2002, 5th Sp. Sess. c. 8, modified the
tion as defined in Subsection 76-3-201(4) by the division name in the introduction to subsec. (13)
defendant;
and the statute references in subsec. (13)(c).
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When a defendant who has given bail appears for trial, the court may, at
any time after his appearance for trial, order him to be committed to the
custody of the proper officer to await the judgment or further order of the
court.
CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence—Probation—Period—Conditions—Revocation.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or
offense, if it appears compatible with the public interest, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period of time as it determines. The legal custody of all probationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the offender and the
chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of the state division of
corrections. In cases that do not involve an indeterminate sentence, the
period of probation may exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence
that could be imposed.
(2) Prior to imposing any sentence for an offense for which probation
may be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time
for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on the defendant. The
contents of the report shall be confidential. The court may disclose all or
parts of the report to the defendant or his counsel as the interest of justice
requires. At the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or
information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. Such testimony or information shall be
presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(3) After hearing, the court may increase or decrease the probation
period and may revoke or modify any condition of probation. While on probation, and as a condition thereof, the defendant may be required to pay, in
one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being placed on probation and may be required to make restitution or reparation to the aggrieved
party or parties for pecuniary damages as provided in section 76-3-201 caused
by the offense to which the defendant had pleaded guilty, no contest or for
which a conviction was had. The defendant may be required to pay amounts
required under provisions of section 77-32a-l through 77-32a-14. He may
also be required to provide for the support of others for whose support he is
legally liable, to participate in rehabilitation programs as may be available,
and to serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year.
(4)(a) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and
a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts asserted
to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes probable
cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may be justified.
If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall cause to be
served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to show cause
why his probation should not be revoked or modified.
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(2) In all cases, proof of the sale, furnishing, bartering or procuring of
any lottery ticket, share or interest therein, or of any instrument purporting
to be a ticket, or part or share of any ticket shall be evidence that the share
or interest was signed and issued according to its purport.
77-17-7. Conviction on testimony of accomplice—Instruction to jury.
(1) A conviction may be had on the uncorroborated testimony of an
accomplice.
(2) In the discretion of the court, an instruction to the jury may be given
to the effect that such uncorroborated testimony should be viewed with caution, and such an instruction shall be given if the trial judge finds the testimony of the accomplice to be self contradictory, uncertain or improbable.
77-17-8. Mistake in charging offense—Procedure.
If at any time before verdict or judgment a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, and it appears that there is probable cause to
believe that the defendant is chargeable with another offense, the court may
commit him or require him to give bail for his appearance to answer to the
proper charge when filed, and may also require witnesses to give bail for their
appearance.
77-17-9. Separation or sequestration of jurors—Oath of officer having
custody.
(1) The court, at any time before the submission of the case to the jury,
may permit the jury to separate or order that it be sequestered in charge of a
proper officer.
(2) If the jury is sequestered the officer shall be sworn to keep the jurors
together until the next meeting of the court, to prevent any person from
speaking or communicating with them, and not to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial, and to return the jury to the court pursuant to
its order.
77-17-10. Court to determine law; the jury, the facts.
(1) In a jury trial, questions of law are to be determined by the court,
questions of fact by the jury.
(2) The jury may find a general verdict which includes questions of law as
well as fact but they are bound to follow the law as stated by the court.
77-17-11. Jury to retire for deliberation—Oath of officer having custody.
After hearing the court's instructions and arguments of counsel, the jury
shall retire for deliberation. An officer shall be sworn to keep them together
in some private and convenient place and not permit any person to speak to
or communicate with them or to do so himself except upon the order of the
court, or to ask them whether they have agreed on a verdict. He shall return
them to court when they have agreed and the court has so ordered, or when
otherwise ordered by the court.
77-17-12. Defendant on bail appearing for trial may be committed.
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CHAPTER 20
S. B. No. 91

(Passed January 28, 1984. In effect March 29, 1984.)

MISDEMEANORS- -PROBATION REDUCTIONS
By Senators Stratford, Cornaby
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; OMITTING PROBATION FOR CLASS C MISDEMEANORS; SPECIFYING PROBATION
PROCEDURES IN GENERAL; AND PLACING RESTITUTION OBLIGATIONS OUTSTANDING AT THE END OF PROBATION UNDER
THE COURTS* CIVIL JURISDICTION FOR COLLECTION.
THIS ACT AMENDS SECTION 77-18-1, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
1953, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 85, LAWS OF UTAH 1983.
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Utah:
Section 1.

Section amended.

Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as last amended by
Chapter 85, Laws of Utah 1983, is amended to read:
7 7 - 1 8 - 1 . Suspension of sentence--Probation--Period-- Supervision - Presentence investigation - - Conditions - - Restitution - - Revocation.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or
offense, except in the case of class C misdemeanors, for which probation
may not be imposed, and if it appears compatible with the public interest,
the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the defendant on probation for [sueh] a period of time [as] it
[ determines ] may determine, unless otherwise provided by law. The legal
custody of all probationers is vested in the court having jurisdiction of the
offender and the chief agent of the adult probation and parole section of
the [state division of corrections] Division of Corrections. [In cases that
do not involve an indeterminate sentence, the period of probation may
exceed the length of time of the maximum sentence that could be imposed.]
(2) (a) The Division of Corrections shall establish presentence investigation and supervision standards for all individuals under its jurisdiction.
These standards shall be based on the type of offense and other criteria,
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including the demand for services and the available agency resources, which
the Division of Corrections deems appropriate to determine what level of
services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted
to the State Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment
prior to adoption by the Division of Corrections.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Division of Corrections is not required to supervise the probation or parole of any person
convicted of a class B or C misdemeanor but may, at the discretion of the
Division of Corrections, and based upon adopted standards, accept a person
for supervision who is convicted of a class B misdemeanor.
[{3)] (4) Prior to imposition of any sentence for an offense for which
probation may be granted, the court may, with the concurrence of the
defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a pre-sentence report on
the defendant The report shall be prepared by the [department of adult
probation and parole] Department of Adult Probation and Parole. The
report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied
by a recommendation from adult probation and parole regarding the
payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report shall be
confidential. The court may disclose all or parts of the report to the
defendant or his counsel as the interest of justice requires. At the time of
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant
or the prosecuting attorney may wish to present concerning the appropriate
sentence. [Such] This testimony or information shall be presented in open
court on record and in the presence of the defendant
[43)] (5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a verdict against
the defendant on a plea of a former conviction or acquittal or once in
jeopardy, if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the court
must appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in accordance with Rule 22,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Whenever possible, in all offenses
involving damage to persons or property, the pre-sentence report of the
defendant shall be made available to the court prior to the pronouncement
of judgment
[(4)] (6) After a hearing, the court may increase or decrease the
probation period, unless otherwise provided by law, and may revoke or
modify any condition of probation. While on probation, and as a condition
thereof, the defendant may be required to:
(a) [Pay] gay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of
being placed on probation;
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(b) [Pay] pa^ amounts required under provisions of Section 77-32a-l
through 77-32a-14;
(c) [Provide] provide for the support of others for whose support he
is legally liable;
(d)

[Participate] participate in available rehabilitation programs;

(e) [Serve] serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one
year; or
(f) [Serve] serve a term of home confinement The court may impose
all or part of the costs of supervision as a condition of home confinement
(7)
Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate under Subsection 76-3-201
(3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition under Subsection 76-3-201
(3) (c).
[{5}] (8) While on probation and as a condition thereof, the defendant
shall be required to make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims
as defined in Subsection 76-3-201 (4) for pecuniary damages as provided in
Section 76-3-201 caused by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was had or by any other
criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court, unless
the court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76-3-201 (3) finds
that restitution is inappropriate. If the court determines that restitution is
inappropriate, the court shall state for the court record the reasons for the
decision.
[(6)] (9) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to
the clerk of the court The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket
and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The order shall be
treated as a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil remedy.
(10) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor
cases, the offender shall be terminated from sentence and the supervision
of the Division of Corrections, unless the person is earlier terminated by
the court
(b) The Division of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court in
writing of all cases where termination of supervision occurs by law. The
notification shall include a probation progress report and complete report
of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
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(11) (a) All time served on probation by any person without violation
applies to service of the total term of probation but does not preclude the
requirement of serving 18 months without violation in felony or class A
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases. Any time
spent by a person outside of confinement after commission of a probation
violation does not constitute service of the total term unless the person is
exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. Any time spent in
confinement awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of the term of probation except in the case
of exoneration at the hearing, in which case the time spent shall be included
in computing the total probation term.
(b) Whenever any probationer, without authority from the Division of
Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or evades probation
supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation
period.
(c)
Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a
probationer at any time, at the discretion of the court
[(?}] (12) (a) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in
court and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes
probable cause to believe that revocation or modification of probation may
be justified. If the court determines that there is probable cause, it shall
cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an order to
show cause why his probation should not be revoked or modified.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing, which shall be within seven days of the service upon the defendant
unless he shows good cause for a continuance, and shall inform the
defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to
have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent The order shall also
inform the defendant of a right to present evidence as provided in the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations, which need
not be evidence admissible in a trial. The persons who have given adverse
information on which the allegations are based shall be presented as
witnesses subject to questioning by the defendant unless the court for good
cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak
in his own behalf, and present evidence.
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(e)
After hearing, the court shall make findings of fact. Upon
determining that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the
court may order the probation revoked, modified, or continued. If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
[(8) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a hearing in court a
finding is made that restitution is inappropriate pursuant to Subsection
76 3-201 (3) (b) or the defendant objects to its imposition pursuant to
Subsection 76 3 201 (3) (c). ]
(13) In cases where an 18-month probation term in felony and class A
misdemeanor cases or a six-month term in class B misdemeanor cases has
been completed without violation, but fine or restitution orders are still
outstanding, supervision by the Division of Corrections shall be terminated
pursuant to this section. The court may retain civil jurisdiction for the
purposes of collecting the fines or restitution. In these cases, the court may
order the Department of Social Services to enforce the collection, and the
Office of Recovery Services may withhold the cost of collection from any
recovered fine or restitution.
[(9)] (14) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt
for "willful and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to
discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A.
Approved February 16, 1984.
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Laws of Utah 1987
1

1953, is enacted to read:
55-15b-13.5. Costs for services to abused spouses
assessed against abusing spouse.
Costs for services provided by the division to
abused spouses under the authority of Section 5515b-7 shall be assessed against the abusing spouse,
according to rules established by the department.
Section 2. Section Amended.
Section 77-36-5, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as enacted by Chapter 114, Laws of Utah 1983, is
amended to read:
77-36-5. Sentencing - Restricting contact with
victim - Counseling - Cost assessed against
defendant.
(1) When a defendant is found guilty of a crime
and a condition of the sentence restricts the defendant's contact with the victim, the condition shall
be included in a written order and the prosecutor
shall provide a certified copy of that order to the
victim.
(2) In determining its sentence, the court, in
addition to penalties otherwise provided for by law,
may require the defendant to participate in treatment or therapy under the direction of an organization or individual experienced in domestic violence
counseling. The court may also require the defendant to pay all or part of the cost of counseling
incurred by the victim, as well as the costs for defendant's own counseling. The court shall assess
against the defendant, as restitution, any costs for
services or treatment provided to the abused spouse
by the Division of Family Services under Section 5515b-7. The court shall order those costs to be paid
directly to the division.

CHAPTER 114
H. B. No. 167
Passed February 25, 1987
Approved March 16, 1987
Effective April 27, 1987
MISDEMEANOR PROBATION AMENDMENTS
By G. LaMont Richards
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDING PROVISIONS RELATED
TO PROBATION AND RESTITUTION
WITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS.
THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:
AMENDS:
77-18-1, AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTERS
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212 AND 229, LAWS OF UTAH 1985
Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 77-18-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
as last amended by Chapters 212 and 229, Laws of
Utah 1985, is amended to read:
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Probation Supervision - Presentence investigation *
Confidential - Terms - Restitution - Extension
or revocation - Hearings.
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, [except in the case
of class C misdemeanors,—for which supervised
probation by the Department of Corrections may
not be imposed, and if it appears compatible with
the public interest,] the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the defendant on probation [for a period of time it may
determine,—unless—otherwise—provided—by—law].
Supervised probation by the department may not be
imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions. The [legal custody] jurisdiction
of all probationers referred to the Department of
Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction
[and]; custody is with the Department of Corrections.
(b) The legal custody of all [unsupervised] probationers not referred to the department is vested [in]
as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the
[offender] defendant. The court has continuing
jurisdiction over all probationers.
. .
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and presentence investigation [and
supervision] standards for all individuals [under its
jurisdiction] referred to the department. These standards shall be based on the type of offense2 [and
other criteria, including] the demand for services1
[and] the [available] availability of agency resources, [which] and other criteria established by the
Department of Corrections [deems appropriate] to
determine what level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the [State] Judicial
Council and Board of Pardons for review and
comment prior to adoption by the Department of
Corrections.
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the
Department of Corrections is not required to supervise the probation [or parole] of [any person]
persons convicted of [a] class B or C [misdemeanor
but may, at the discretion of the Department of
Corrections, and based upon adopted standards,
accept a person for supervision who is convicted of
a class B misdemeanor] misdemeanors or infractions,
or to conduct presentence investigation reports on
class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the
department may supervise the probation of class B
misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence [fef
an offense for which probation may be granted], the
court may, with the concurrence of the defendant,
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for
a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obt-

Laws of
aining a presentence investigation report from the
Department of Corrections or information from
other sources [enJ about the defendant. [The report
shall be prepared by the adult probation and parole
section of the Department of Corrections.] The
presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied
by a recommendation from [Adult Probation and
Parole] the Department of Corrections regarding the
payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report [shall be] are confidential and not
available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council and for use by
the Department of Corrections. [The court may
disclose all or parts of the report to the defendant
or his counsel as the interest of justice requires.] At
the time of sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney [may wish] desires to present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony or
information shall be presented in open court on
record and in the presence of the defendant.
[(5) After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a
verdict against the defendant on a plea of a former
conviction or acquittal or once in jeopardy, if the
judgment is not arrested or a new trial granted, the
court shall appoint a time for pronouncing judgment in accordance with Rule 22, Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. When possible, in all offenses
involving damage to persons or property, the presentence report of the defendant shall be made available to the court prior to the pronouncement of
judgment.]
[(6) After a hearing, the court may increase or
decrease the probation period,—unless—otherwise
provided by law, and may revoke or modify any
condition of probation.]
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of
probation, the defendant may be required to
perform any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed
at the time of being placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under [provisions of
Section 77 32a-1—through 77 32a 14] Chapter
32a, Title 77, Defense Costs;
(c) provide for the support of others for whose
support he is legally liable;
(d) participate in available [rehabilitation]
treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to
exceed one year; [OF]
(f) serve a term of home confinement [. The court
may impose all or part of the costs of supervision as
a condition of home confinement.fc
(g) participate in community service restitution
programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation,
and treatment services; and
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or
victims in accordance with Subsections 76-3-201
(3) and (4).
[(7) Restitution shall be imposed unless upon a
hearing in court a finding is made that restitution is
inappropriate under Subsection 76 3 201—(3) (b)
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or the defendant objects to its imposition under
Subsection 76 3 201 (3) (c).]
[(8) While on probation and as a condition of
probation, the defendant shall be required to make
restitution or reparation to the victim or victims as
defined in Subsection 76 3-201 (4) for pecuniary
damages as provided in Section 76-3 201 caused
by the offense to which the defendant has pleaded
guilty, no contest, or for which a conviction was
had or by any other criminal conduct admitted by
the defendant to the sentencing court, unless the
court in applying the criteria stated in Subsection 76 •
3 201 (3) finds that restitution is inappropriate. If
the court determines that restitution is inappropr
iate, the court shall state for the court record the
reasons for the decision.]
[{9)] (6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines and restitution
during the probation period in cases where the court
orders supervised probation by the department. The
prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution
order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place
the order on the civil docket and shall provide
notice of the order to the parties. The order [shall
be treated as] is considered a legal judgment under
which the victim may seek civil remedy.
K±0)] (7} (a) Upon completion without violation
of 18 months' probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor cases, the [offender] probation period shall be
terminated [from sentence], unless [the person is]
earlier terminated by the court.
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify
the sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in
writing [30] 45 days in advance in all cases where
termination of supervision will occur by law. The
notification shall include a probation progress report
and complete report of details on outstanding fines
and restitution orders.
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation [the court may, after a hearing with proper
notice, upon its own motion or the motion of the
prosecutor, extend probation for good cause shown,
for one additional term of 18 months in felony or
class A misdemeanor cases or six months in class B
misdemeanor cases. The reasons for the extension of
the probation period shall be made a part of the
court record], upon a minimum of five days' notice
and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and
hearing by the probationer, the court may extend
probation for an additional term of 18 months in
felony or class A misdemeanors or six months in
class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both
are owing.
[(d) On a plea of guilty or no contest or convic
tion of any crime or offense by a defendant presently serving a term of probation, the court may
order that the term of probation for the original
crime or offense commence again for the full term.]
[(44)] (8) (a) All time served without violation
while on probation [by any person without violatien] applies to service of the total term of probation
but does not [preclude] eliminate the requirement of
serving 18 consecutive months without violation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six
consecutive months without violation in class B
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misdemeanor cases. Any time [spent] served by a
[person] probationer outside of confinement after
[commission of] having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to revoke
probation does not constitute service of time toward
the total probation term unless the [person]
probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the
probation. Any time [spent] served in confinement
awaiting a hearing or decision concerning revocation
of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term [of probation
except—in] unless the [ease—of—exoneration]
probationer is exonerated at the hearing[, in which
case the time spent shall be included in computing
the total probation term].
(b) [Whenever] When any probationer, without
authority from the court or the Department of
Corrections, absents himself from the state, or
avoids or evades probation supervision, the period
of absence, avoidance, or evasion tolls the probation
period.
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court
from discharging a probationer at any time, at the
discretion of the court.
[(42)] (9) (a) [Probation] Except as provided in
Subsection (7) (c) of this chapter, probation may not
be [revoked] modified or extended except upon
waiver of a hearing by the probationer or upon a
hearing [in court] and a finding in court that the
probationer has violated the conditions of probation
[have been violated]. Probation may not be revoked
except upon a hearing in court and a finding that
the conditions of probation have been violated.
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of
the conditions of probation, the court which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, [er] modification, or extension of probation
[may be] is justified. If the court determines that
there is probable cause, it shall cause to be served
on the defendant a copy of the affidavit and an
order to show cause why his probation should not
be revoked2 [OF] modified, or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time
and place for the hearing, [which shall be within
seven days of the service upon the defendant unless
he shows] and shall be served upon the defendant at
least five days prior to the hearing. The defendant
shall show good cause for a continuance [-rand]. The
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a
right to be represented by counsel at the hearing and
to have counsel appointed for him if he is indigent.
The order shall also inform the defendant of a right
to present evidence [as provided in the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure].
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or
deny the allegations of the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the
allegations!, which need not be evidence admissible
in a trial]. The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based shall be
presented as witnesses subject to questioning by the
defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise
orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear
and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.
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(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings of
fact. Upon [determining] a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court
may order the probation revoked, modified, [er]
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously
imposed shall be executed.
[(13) In cases where an—18 month—probation
term in felony and class A misdemeanor cases or a
six-month term in class B misdemeanor cases has
been completed without violation, but fine or restitution orders are still outstanding, supervision by
the Department of Corrections shall be terminated
pursuant to this section. In class B misdemeanors
where probation supervision is not provided, the
court may order the Department of Corrections to
monitor the payment of any fine or restitution
ordered and give the court notice of the completion
of payment or the failure of the defendant to make
payment as ordered. The court may retain jurisdiction for the purposes of collecting the fines or restitution. In these cases, the court may order the
Department of Social Services to enforce the collection, and the Office of Recovery Services may
withhold the cost of collection from any recovered
fine or restitution.]
[(W)] (10) Restitution imposed under this- chapter
is considered a debt for "willful and malicious
injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section
523, U.S.C.A. 1985.
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AMENDS:
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Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
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determine w h a t level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and
Board of Pardons on an annual basis for review and
comment prior to adoption by the Department of
Corrections.

PROBATION AMENDMENTS

(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures to implement the supervision
and investigation standards.

By R. Lee Ellertson
AN ACT RELATING TO CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; AMENDING PROVISIONS REGARDING PROBATION, INCLUDING THE
LENGTH OF PROBATION AND SUPERVISION.

(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall
annually consider modifications to the standards
based upon criteria in Subsection (2) (a) and other
criteria as they consider appropriate.

THIS ACT AFFECTS SECTIONS OF UTAH CODE
ANNOTATED 1953 AS FOLLOWS:

(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall
annually prepare an impact report and submit it to
the appropriate legislative appropriations committee.

AMENDS:
7 7 - 1 8 - 1 , AS LAST AMENDED BY CHAPTER 114,
LAWS OF UTAH 1987

(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the
Department of Corrections is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or
C misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, t h e department
may supervise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:
S e c t i o n 1. S e c t i o n A m e n d e d .
Section 7 7 - 1 8 - 1 , Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
last amended by Chapter 114, Laws of U t a h 1987, is
amended to read:
77-18-1. S u s p e n s i o n of s e n t e n c e — P r o b a t i o n
— Supervision — Presentence investigat i o n — S t a n d a r d s — Confidential — Terms
— Termination — R e s t i t u t i o n — R e v o c a tion — Hearings.

(4) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the
court may, with the concurrence of t h e defendant,
continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections or information from other
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement
of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential
and not available except for purposes of sentencing
as provided by rule of the Judicial Council and for
use by the Department of Corrections.

(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or offense, the court may suspend
the imposition or execution of sentence and place
the defendant on probation. [Supervised] The court
may place the defendant:
(i) on probation [fey] under the supervision of the
[department may not be imposed by the court] Department of Corrections except in cases of class C
misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a private organization; or

(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall hear
any testimony or information the defendant or the
prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning
the appropriate sentence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on record
and in the presence of the defendant.

(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court. [The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Department of Corrections is
vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is
with the Department of Corrections.]
(b) The legal custody of all probationers [not referred to] under the supervision of the department
is with the Department of Corrections. The legal
custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the
court [having jurisdiction of the defendant]. The
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probation-

(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may be required to perform
any or all of the following:
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed a t
the time of being placed on probation;
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a,
Title 77, Defense Costs;

(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and presentence investigation
standards for all individuals referred to the department. These standards shall be based on the type of
offense, the demand for services, the availability of
agency resources, the public safety, and other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to

(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally liable;
(d) participate in available treatment programs;
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to
exceed one year;
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(f) serve a term of home confinement;

with a probation violation and prior to a hearing to
revoke probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to revoke the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a
hearing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time toward the
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at the hearing.

(g) participate in community service restitution
programs;
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation,
and treatment services; [and]
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or
victims in accordance with Subsections 76-3-201
(3) and (4)[J; and

(b) [When any probationer, without authority
from the court or the Department of Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidanco, or evasion tolls the probation period.] The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing
of a violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and conditions of probation or upon
the issuance of an order to show cause or warrant by
the court.

(j) comply with other terms and conditions the
court considers appropriate,
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible,
upon order of the court, for the collection of fines and
restitution during the probation period in cases
[where] for which the court orders supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the clerk of the
court. The clerk shall place the order on the civil
docket and shall provide notice of the order to the
parties. The order is considered a legal judgment
[under which the victim may sock civil remedy] enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

[(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court
from discharging a probationer at any time, at the
discretion of the court.]
(9) (a) [Except a3 provided in Subsection (7) (c) of
this chapter, probation] Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing by
the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions ofprobation. Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the
conditions of probation have been violated.

(7) (a) [Upon] Probation may be terminated at any
time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of [18 months'] 36 months
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or
[six] 12 months in cases of class B [misdemeanor
cases, the probation period shall be tcrminatccVunlo3s earlier terminated by the court] or C misdemeanors or infractions. If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the probation period, has
outstanding fines or restitution owing, the court
may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of
enforcing the payment of fines and restitution.
Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its
own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be
treated as contempt of court or why the suspended
jail or prison term should not be imposed.

(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with
particularity facts asserted to constitute violation of
the conditions of probation, the court [which] that
authorized probation shall determine [whether] if
the affidavit establishes probable cause to believe
that revocation, modification, or extension of probation is justified. If the court determines [that] there
is probable cause, it shall cause to be served on the
defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time
and place for the hearing, and shall be served upon
the defendant at least five days prior to the hearing.
The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be represented by counsel at the
hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if he
is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present evidence.

(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the
sentencing court and prosecuting attorney in writing [45 days] in advance in all cases [where] when
termination of [supervision] supervised probation
will occur by law. The notification shall include a
probation progress report and complete report of details on outstanding fines and restitution orders.
[(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and hearing by the
probationer, the court may extend probation for an
additional term of 18 months in felony or class A
misdemeanors or six months in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both arc owing.]

(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or
d e ^ the allegations of the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the
allegations. The persons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are based shall
be presented as witnesses subject to questioning by
the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence.

(8) (a) [All time served without violation while on
probation applies to service of the total term of probation but docs not eliminate the requirement of
serving 18 consecutive months without violation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in clas3 B misdemeanor ca3ca.] Any time served by a probationer
outside of confinement after having been charged

(e) After the hearing^] the court shall make findings of fact. Upon a finding that the defendant vio690
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lated the conditions of probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, continued, or
that the entire probation term commence anew. If
probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be
executed.
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is
considered a debt for "willful and malicious injury"
for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in
bankruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523,
U.S.C.A. 1985.

691

Ch. 226

